


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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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
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Outbreaks of Violence in Brazil



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*Brazil: Bitter fighting erupted last night between security forces and groups of armed students and extremists.

Army and marine troops were called into action in Rio de Janeiro following a violent clash that left at least one demonstrator dead and several police wounded. Tanks moved into the city after Guanabara State Governor Negrao de Lima called for federal aid. A demonstrator was also killed in Goiania, capital of the interior state of Goias, and violence flared in Belo Horizonte as well. Large demonstrations occurred in many other cities throughout the country.

Although the Costa e Silva government was the demonstrators' principal target, the US came in for its share of abuse. A Molotov cocktail reportedly was thrown at the US AID mission in Rio and the USIS installations in Fortaleza and Porto Alegre were sacked. Security guards have been placed around most other US facilities.

The government has charged that Communists and "suspect politicians" are behind the agitation. The President is reported to have decided to prosecute fiery opposition leader Carlos Lacerda for violating the national security law. Many military men have urged such action and may well fear that Lacerda can make capital of the student crisis. There is little assurance that the administration's case is strong enough to obtain a conviction, but the prosecution itself would be certain to increase internal political turmoil as well as to furnish Lacerda with an excellent platform for continuing his vituperative criticism.

Political tension seems sure to build if military pressure leads to even stronger government counter-reactions, and renewed violence is possible.

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(Map)

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Poland: Party boss Gomulka may have lost his position as undisputed leader of the Polish party.

Official utterances have for more than two weeks implied that Gomulka is a spokesman for an unspecified "party leadership." Gomulka has not contradicted these innuendos, possibly in part because he feels that he may yet re-emerge on top in the intraparty struggle. He may also feel that an admission he is under attack could lead to further public violence with unpredictable consequences.

Gomulka's name was constantly used to justify the stern repression of the recent unrest among Polish youth. At the same time, regime propaganda has ignored the moderate statements which were sprinkled through Gomulka's speech on 19 March and has instead emphasized passages about purging and punishing the "instigators" of unrest, that is, Jews and liberals.

Gomulka seems to be playing for time. A meeting of provincial party first secretaries on 26 March reportedly was a stormy one, but Gomulka is said to have successfully resisted pressure to convene a central committee plenum soon. Gomulka probably believed that a plenum would only reveal the extent of his weakened position, and result in premature calls for shifts in the leadership.

Gomulka probably hopes to avoid a reckoning until the party congress late this year. Meanwhile, he will probably attempt to prevent his own supporters from being swept out in a purge of the party's extremist elements. At the moment, however, it is not clear that he will be able to reassert his control of the party, especially if there should be renewed public violence.

[REDACTED]

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Guatemala: The shifts in the army hierarchy last week may cost President Mendez his vital military support.

The commanders of civilian counterinsurgency groups in the Department of Zacapa and officers of the army brigade there have already begun to plot a coup against the President.

The plotters apparently interpret the changes in the army leadership as a move to end the army's support of extralegal counterinsurgency operations and rely on the judicial system to cope with the Communist terrorist threat. This interpretation may have been strengthened by a country-wide radio-TV broadcast by the new defense minister calling on all Guatemalans to lay down their arms.

If Mendez eliminates extralegal counterterrorist programs or if the Communists are able to mount another successful terrorist campaign, the plotters are likely to find increased support among other military and rightist civilian elements.

[REDACTED]

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NOTES

Jordan-Israel: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Although Israeli officials are apparently divided on their policy toward Jordan, the inevitable continuance of terrorist activities will almost certainly provoke further Israeli reprisals. There is continuing debate in Israel itself, however, over what form reprisals should take. [REDACTED]

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Saudi Arabia - Yemen: The Saudis are fed up with continued bickering among Yemeni royalist leaders.

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[REDACTED] The Saudis are still extremely nervous about the Soviet presence in Yemen, and this action is essentially a shock tactic to pressure the royalists to organize more effectively. The Saudis say they are not irrevocably tied to the present royal family in Yemen and want the Yemenis to make their own choice of a leader that all will agree to follow. [REDACTED]

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*Panama: The Supreme Court reconvened yesterday but did not render a decision on issues relating to the impeachment of President Robles. There are still no indications as to whether the court intends to rule within the next few days or to drag out the proceedings--possibly until the elections on 12 May--and thereby allow the de facto Robles government to stay in power. While the court is deliberating, Arnulfo Arias' National Union will probably try to keep pressure on Robles and the National Guard through demonstrations and disorders.

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Belgium: Last Sunday's national elections failed to bring a solution of the country's divisive linguistic dispute any closer, and the formation of a stable government will be difficult. The three major parties lost and the two small extremist parties registered some gains, but not enough to make them a factor in negotiations for a new coalition. Some Belgian political observers are already predicting another election within a few months.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 1 April 1968 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 32-68 "Pakistan: Internal Developments and Foreign Outlook"

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